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Summary 
In its broadest sense, biometrics is the measurement and analysis of a biological 
characteristic (fingerprints, iris patterns, retinas, face or hand geometry) or a behavioural 
characteristic (voice, gait or signature). Biometric technologies use these characteristics to 
identify individuals automatically. Unlike identity documents or passwords, biometrics 
cannot be lost or forgotten since they are a part of the user and are always present at the 
time of identification. They are also difficult, though not impossible, to forge or share.  
Three future trends in the application of biometrics were identified during the inquiry: the 
growth of unsupervised biometric systems, accessed via mobile devices, which verify 
identity; the proliferation of “second-generation” biometric technologies that can 
authenticate individuals covertly; and the linking of biometric data with other types of ‘big 
data’ as part of efforts to profile individuals.  
Each of these trends introduces risks and benefits to individuals, to the state and to society 
as a whole. They also raise important ethical and legal questions relating to privacy and 
autonomy. We are not convinced that the Government has addressed these questions, nor 
are we satisfied that it has looked ahead and considered how the risks and benefits of 
biometrics will be managed and communicated to the public.  
The Government has been largely silent on the matter since the abolition of the 
Government’s Identity Card Programme in 2010 and the destruction of the National 
Identity Register. And yet, in other policy areas, including immigration and law 
enforcement, the use of biometric identification systems by the state has expanded. If the 
Government is to build public trust in biometric data and technologies, there is a need for 
open dialogue and greater transparency. We therefore recommend that the Government 
sets out how it plans to facilitate an open, public debate around the use of biometrics. 
Management of the risks and benefits of biometrics should have been a core element of the 
Government’s joint forensics and biometrics strategy. Despite undertaking to publish this 
document at the end of 2013, we were dismayed to find that there is still no Government 
strategy, no consensus on what it should include, and no expectation that it will be 
published in this Parliament. This is inexcusable. We expect a comprehensive, cross-
departmental forensics and biometrics strategy to be published by the Government no later 
than December 2015.   
In the absence of a biometrics strategy, there has been a worrying lack of Government 
oversight and regulation of aspects of this field. We were particularly concerned to hear 
that the police are uploading photographs taken in custody, including images of people not 
subsequently charged with, or convicted of, a crime, to the Police National Database and 
applying facial recognition software. Although the High Court ruled in 2012 that existing 
policy concerning the retention of custody photograph by the police was “unlawful”, this 
gap in the legislation has persisted. At the very least, there should be day-to-day, 
independent oversight of the police use of all biometrics. We therefore recommend that the 
Biometrics Commissioner’s jurisdiction should be extended beyond DNA and fingerprints 
to cover, at a minimum, the police use and retention of facial images. 
 








1. Authenticating personal identity is an integral part of participating in modern life. From 
entering an office building and logging on to a networked computer, to applying for a 
mortgage, we are regularly faced with requests to verify who we are. More ‘traditional’ 
authentication methods rely on an individual knowing and recounting key personal details, 
such as their date of birth or address, and presenting documents that corroborate their 
answers, including a driver’s licence, a birth certificate, or passport. In other contexts, an 
individual might be required to enter a password or PIN code, or present a security pass. 
2. In most instances, the purpose of this type of identity authentication is to prevent illegal 
activities and to inhibit imposters from acquiring something that is protected. An identity, 
in other words, is valuable. In an increasingly globalised world, where we interact in virtual 
as well as physical spaces, our personal data can travel with ease across geographical 
boundaries, sometimes leaving us unsure about where, and by whom, our data is held. 
Furthermore, the documents, tokens and codes relied upon as proxy representations can 
be lost, forgotten, stolen, forged and manipulated. This is particularly problematic for 
citizens who, in the face of heightened concerns about national security, terrorism and 
identity theft, are increasingly required to be readily identifiable. Both Government and 
industry have attempted to address some of these problems through developing ever more 
sophisticated authentication practices. This report focuses on one aspect of that work; the 
development of a suite of techniques collectively known as ‘biometrics’. 
3. Biometrics has been described as the “science of establishing the identity of an individual 
based on the physical, chemical or behavioural attributes of the person”.1 These attributes 
(or ‘traits’) include, but are not limited to, fingerprints, retinas, irises, faces, hand geometry, 
DNA, voice and gait. In biometric systems, they are used for automated, or semi-
automated, identity recognition by comparing a trait captured in ‘real-time’ by a sensor (a 
‘live template’) against a copy of the same trait stored on a database, or on a token held by 
the user, such as a smart card (a ‘stored template’). Comparison is achieved through the 
application of a matching algorithm and a match score is generated. The match score 
indicates the degree of similarity between the two templates being compared: the higher 
the score the more certain the system is that the two templates belong to the same person. 
4. Biometric systems are thought to have a number of advantages over traditional methods 
of verifying identity: they cannot be lost or forgotten since they usually require the 
individual to be present at the time of identification and they are difficult to copy, forge or 
share. With the exception of photo ID passes, the use of biometric systems has, until 
comparatively recently, been confined to law-enforcement, national security and military 
contexts. As the technologies have matured, and the financial and computational resources 
required have become more widely available, the use of biometric systems has spread into 
more commercial and consumer-focused applications. Accompanying this growth in 
1  Anil K Jain and Arun Ross, Introduction to Biometrics in Handbook of Biometrics by Anil K. Jain, Patrick Flynn, Arun 
A. Ross (New York, 2008) p1 
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commercial applications of biometrics has been a shift in their deployment by the state. 
Our predecessors examined the use of biometrics in the Government’s Identity Card 
Programme in 2006.2 Among other things, this programme established a ‘National Identity 
Register’ which recorded individuals’ “biometric information”.3 However, the Identity 
Documents Act 2010 subsequently made provision to repeal the Identity Cards Act 2006 
and destroy all the information, including biometric data, recorded in the National Identity 
Register.4  
5. Two years later, further regulation of biometric data was introduced following the 
passage of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA).5 Part 1 of the Act introduced a new 
regime governing the retention and use by the police in England and Wales of DNA 
samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints.6 The Act also included provisions relating to the 
protection of biometric information of children in schools, including a requirement to 
“notify and obtain consent before processing [their] biometric information”.7 To provide 
independent oversight of this new regime, the PoFA introduced a statutory ‘Commissioner 
for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material’ (the Biometrics Commissioner). 
Our inquiry 
6. On 7 August 2014, we announced our inquiry on Current and future uses of biometric 
data and technologies and sought written submissions addressing the following points:  
a) How might biometric data be applied in the future? Please give examples.  
b) What are the key challenges facing both Government and industry in developing, 
implementing and regulating new technologies that rely on biometric data? How might 
these be addressed? 
c)  How effective is current legislation governing the ownership of biometric data and 
who can collect, store and use it? 
d)  Should the Government be identifying priorities for research and development in 
biometric technologies? Why? 
7. We received 33 written submissions and took oral evidence from 14 witnesses including: 
• academics working in the fields of biometrics and forensic science; 
2  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06, Identity Card 
Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence, HC 1032 
3  Identity Cards Act 2006. Schedule 1  
4  Identity Documents Act 2010, section 1; Identity Cards Act 2006 
5  Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Part 1 
6  The biometric provisions were introduced in response to, among other things, the decision of the European Court 
on Human Rights in the case of S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], which held that holding DNA samples of 
individuals arrested, but later acquitted, or who have the charges against them dropped, is a violation of the right 
to privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
7  Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 26 
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• representatives from commercial organisations developing and implementing 
biometric systems; 
• a civil liberties group; 
• the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
• officials from the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Office of the Biometrics 
Commissioner; 
• the Government, represented by Lord Bates, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Criminal Information, Home Office (hereafter “the Minister”) and Marek Rejman-
Greene, Senior Biometrics Adviser, Home Office. 
We would like to thank everyone who contributed to the inquiry. 
8. This report considers both the commercial applications of biometrics and the use of 
biometric systems by the state, particularly in the context of law enforcement and criminal 
justice. The future uses of biometrics and the Government’s readiness for these 
applications are considered in Chapter 2, while Chapter 3 examines the diverse challenges 
facing both Government and industry in developing and implementing biometric systems. 
Chapter 4 then focuses on the effectiveness of current legislation governing the use of 
biometric data and questions whether it remains fit for purpose. In response to evidence 
received about the use of facial recognition software by the police, we particularly examine 
whether the Government is prepared for prospective developments in biometrics that 
might pose challenges to current policy and legislation. 
Ethical considerations 
9. Throughout this report, we are primarily concerned with the science and technology of 
biometrics. However, the application of biometric data and technologies undoubtedly 
raises ethical and legal questions related to privacy, autonomy, informed consent, 
confidentiality and liberty. These values are not absolute but, in liberal democracies like the 
UK, there is a strong presumption of not restricting them.8 The principle of 
proportionality—ensuring that a balance is struck between society’s need for a biometric 
system and an individual’s privacy rights—is therefore examined in detail in Chapter 3 and 
guides many of the subsequent recommendations in this report. 
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2 Future uses of biometrics 
11. In early 2014, analysts forecast that the global biometrics market would grow from $8.7 
billion in 2013 to nearly $27.5 billion by 2019 and register a five-year compound annual 
growth rate of 19.8% between 2014 and 2019. In Europe, a slightly lower compound annual 
growth rate of 17.25% was projected between 2013 and 2018.9 This chapter considers the 
drivers of this predicted expansion and examines how biometric data might be used in the 
near future. It then turns to question if, and how, the Government is preparing for these 
trends.  
Functionalities of a biometric system 
12. Witnesses from industry were optimistic about growth prospects of biometrics. 
Pointing to the “staggering increases in the speed and accuracy of automated biometric 
search engines”, 3M stated that the science and technology of biometrics had “advanced 
quickly and significantly over the past two decades”; a trend they expected “to continue or 
accelerate in the future”.10 Others were more circumspect in their analysis of future 
prospects. Professors Nixon and Kittler described the science of confirming identity by 
personal characteristic as being “young at present” while Innovate UK told us that the 
“penetration of early adopter markets such as banking [was] still required before biometric 
technologies [became] second nature”.11   
13. At present, biometric systems can be used in at least three different ways: 
• Verification: ensuring that a person is who they claim to be  
• Identification: determining who a person is (e.g. identifying a person in a crowd) 
• Screening: determining whether a person belongs to a ‘watch list’ of identities. 
Biometrics can be implemented as ‘supervised’ systems, such as at border crossings and as 
part of immigration control, or as ‘unattended’ systems that are used remotely ‘on-the-go’ 
increasingly via sensors on mobile phones. With supervised systems, the environmental 
surroundings (e.g. lighting, ambient conditions) are controlled and there is the opportunity 
for human intervention should a problem arise. For example, if the ePassport gates at 
Heathrow Airport, which rely on facial recognition, are not working, a passenger is still 
able to have his or her passport checked manually by a UK Border Agency official. The 
ePassport gates are also monitored by officials to prevent the system being ‘spoofed’. 
14. Our witnesses forecast three future trends in the application of biometrics: first, the 
growth of unsupervised systems that verify identity; second, the proliferation of “second-
generation” biometric technologies that can authenticate individuals remotely without 
9  Companies and Markets, ‘Biometrics: Technologies and Global Markets’, last accessed 2 February 2015; Business 
Wire, 'Research and Markets: European Biometrics Market 2014-2018', accessed 12 January 2015  
10  3M (BIO0018) para 8; see also Identity Assurance Systems (BIO0031) para 3.1 
11  Professor Nixon and Professor Kittler (BIO0010)  para 9; Innovate UK (BIO0029) para 7; see also Super-identity 
project (BIO0015) para 11 
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their knowledge; and third, the linking of biometric data with other types of ‘big data’ as 
part of efforts to ‘profile’ individuals. 
Trend 1: Mobile biometrics 
15. The use of unsupervised biometric systems, accessed via sensors on mobile devices, was 
singled out as an area likely to experience growth in the near future. Northrop Grumman 
predicted that “biometric applications for […] mobile devices [would] proliferate” while 
the Biometrics Institute quoted its 2014 survey which identified “mobility” as the “most 
significant development” in biometric systems that was on the horizon, particularly 
through the “adoption of mobile payments”.12 Dr Richard Guest, University of Kent, 
anticipated that the “ubiquity of mobile devices capable of obtaining biometric samples” 
would “enable biometric usage in innovative contexts”. He added that this would 
potentially represent a “paradigm shift” in which biometrics would become “an everyday”, 
rather than an occasional, “method of assuring identity”.13  
16. A number of mobile biometrics are already in operation. Barclays, for example, 
announced that from 2015 it would be rolling out a biometric reader to access accounts for 
its corporate clients, instead of using a password or PIN. The reader will scan a finger and 
identify unique vein patterns.14 The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) also 
highlighted how some mobile phones and laptops now contained “fingerprint sensors to 
authenticate the device’s owner in order to grant or deny access to the device”; a move the 
ICO described as placing biometric systems in “the hands of individuals”, rather than 
restricting their use to “governments or law enforcement agencies”.15 Sir John Adye, 
Identity Assurance Systems, drew attention to the Apple iPhone 6 which, he noted, could 
be used for “Apple payments” using its ‘Touch ID’ (‘a fingerprint identity sensor’).16 On the 
other hand, Ben Fairhead, 3M, pointed out that these technologies were not yet in 
widespread use, while Dr Guest suggested that “consumer-level” mobile biometrics—like 
the iPhone 6—currently had something of a “gimmick value”.17 
Trend 2: Covert identification of individuals 
17. Deploying biometric systems to identify a stranger and determine who they are was 
another prospective trend identified by witnesses. The ‘stranger’ may be unaware that this 
type of identification is taking place. According to the National Security Alliance, “second-
generation biometric technologies […] can authenticate individuals remotely without their 
knowledge”, a point echoed by Big Brother Watch.18 At present, covert identification is 
primarily achieved through facial recognition software. Northrop Grumman expected 
12  Northrop Grumman (BIO0030) para 3.i; Biometrics Institute Limited (BIO0003) para 4.1 
13  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 1. Dr Guest submitted evidence jointly with two other 
academics: Dr Sarah Stevenage, University of Southampton and Professor Sue Black, University of Dundee 
14  "Barclays taps vein biometrics in bank fraud fight", Reuters, 5 September 2014 
15  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) paras 11&12 
16  Q46; see also https://www.apple.com/uk/iphone-6/touch-id/. According to Apple, Apple Pay works by holding your 
iPhone near a contactless reader, with your finger on Touch ID, in order to authorise a payment. At the time of 
writing, Apple Pay had been launched in the United States but was not available in Europe. 
17  Q31 [Ben Fairhead]; Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO 0015) para 11 
18  National Security Alliance (BIO0007); Big Brother Watch (BIO0002) 
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“surveillance applications for finding and identifying faces in crowds” to start to “flourish 
with advancements in face matching algorithms, better cameras and lenses that can see and 
match in partial lighting conditions”.19 
18. The Government acknowledged that there was “an increasing interest in the 
application of automated facial recognition systems” and pointed to a “pilot project being 
run by Leicestershire Constabulary”.20 The project—the ‘NeoFace system’—uses 
measurements taken from an image of a face and compares them to 92,000 images on the 
police force's database. The BBC have reported that the images could come from anywhere, 
though CCTV and police body cameras had been the most common source so far.21 Both 
the Biometrics Commissioner and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) drew 
attention to this software, while the ICO suggested that “the surreptitious collection of 
information about individuals that they would not necessarily expect” could also come 
from “a fingerprint or genetic material left behind”, and not just from “facial recognition in 
live or recorded images”.22 
19. As well as deploying this technology for national security and law-enforcement 
purposes, other witnesses noted that it could be used as part of consumer marketing. The 
Biometrics Institute highlighted the example of ‘photos’ being captured by CCTV in public 
spaces, such as casinos and shopping centres, and subsequently matched “with photos 
from social networking sites with the aim of identifying the individuals and selling the 
information to brokers to target these people with advertising campaigns about betting”.23  
Trend 3: Linking biometric data  
20. In our earlier report, the Responsible Use of Data, we highlighted the potential offered 
by ‘Big Data’24 and noted that the Government, in partnership with the Economic and 
Social Research Council’s Administrative Data Research Network, was working to 
“facilitate access to, and linkage of, de-identified administrative data routinely collected by 
government departments and other public sector organisations”.25 Linking together these 
different data has been strongly supported by the Government for its potential to “join the 
dots” and establish rich, contextualised insights that could “provide a sound evidence base 
to inform research, and policy development, implementation and evaluation”.26  
19  Northrop Grumman (BIO0030) para 3 
20  The Government (BIO0035)para 3.2 
21  "Leicestershire Police trial facial recognition software", BBC News Online, 15 July 2014  
22  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0027) para 7 onwards; Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 8 
23  Biometrics Institute Limited (BIO0003) 
24  According to the Information Commissioner’s Office, Big Data is characterised “by volume, variety and velocity of 
data, and by the use of algorithms, using ‘all’ the data and repurposing data” see Information Commissioner’s 
Office, Big data and data protection, (July 2014), para 1 
25  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2014–15, Responsible Use of Data, 
HC 245, footnote 9 
26  Civil Service Quarterly, Joining the dots, 15 October 2014, accessed 26 January 2015; Economic and Social Research 
Council, The Big Data Family is born - David Willetts MP announces the ESRC Big Data Network, 10 October 2013, 
accessed 26 January 2015  
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21. Some witnesses predicted that “advanced algorithmic analytics” would lead to 
biometric data being seen and used “as simply more available data points in a ‘big data’ 
world”.27 Professor Louise Amoore, Durham University, was clear that a “likely future 
trajectory” was a shift towards “the integration of biometric data” into a “much larger and 
rapidly growing array of digital ‘big data’” in ways that were “capable of producing profiles 
or behavioural maps of individuals and groups”.28 British Standards Institution (BSI) 
similarly predicted that the identification of individuals would “be possible using a wider 
range of non-traditional biometric data sets and […] by combining data sets using 'Big 
Data' approaches”.29  
22. Professor Amoore described such developments as potentially “game-changing” on the 
grounds that there are:  
analytics engines […] that can mine biometric data that is available on the 
internet, and link that to other forms of data […] That moves us more in the 
direction of indicating not just who someone is but suggesting that one might 
be able to infer someone’s intent from some of the biometric data.30 
23. Evidence from the Super-Identity Project indicated that this potential was already being 
realised. Dr Richard Guest, University of Kent, noted how the project had shown that 
biometric data could be linked with “cyber activity and personality assessment” data in 
such a way that made it possible to obtain “unknown elements of identity from known 
elements”.31 Adidas’ “Consumer DNA” system was also highlighted as a further example of 
data linkage. According to Professor Amoore:  
it is asking what the ideal future Adidas customer looks like. It is using 
YouTube videos, and it wants to know not just what this person likes to do, 
what music they like to listen to, what trainers they are likely to purchase, but 
it also wants to know when they are next present online. Part of that is 
knowing something about their biometric template from the facial biometric 
data.32 
Government horizon scanning 
24. In its written evidence, the Government acknowledged that there had been significant 
growth in the “use of biometric information for identification, by the state and others” and 
also recognised some of the trends outlined in this Chapter.33 Considering “how emerging 
trends and developments might potentially affect current policy and practice” is, according 
to the Government, an integral part of “horizon scanning” and is “already being done in 
27  Professor Amoore (BIO0006) para 1.2 
28  Professor Amoore (BIO0006) paras 1.1 & 1.2; see also National Security Alliance (BIO0007) para 1.2 
29  British Standards Institution (BIO0020) para 3.2 
30  Q3 [Professor Amoore] 
31  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 3 
32  Q17 
33  The Government (BIO0035) para 1.2 
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government departments”.34 Our inquiry into Government horizon scanning found it to 
be a “potentially valuable activity” that could “enhance both short- and long-term decision-
making” but we also identified “inconsistencies of practice and performance” across 
government departments. 35 
25. During this inquiry, the Government provided only a limited amount of detail on how 
emerging trends and developments might potentially affect current policy and practice in 
biometrics. The Minister cautioned that it was “very difficult to get out in front” in 
biometrics since the Government was “often reacting to particular stories, concerns and 
issues that come to light in the public square”.36 Indeed, where emerging technologies are 
concerned, we have observed successive Governments make limited efforts to get out on 
the front foot. Instead, the Government stated that its written evidence indicated “the 
direction of travel the Government [wished] to set in this area”. 37 The lack of 
accompanying information about how this was to be achieved in practice was particularly 
apparent in the case of the Government’s “Identity Assurance Programme” (IAP). 
26. The IAP is a Cabinet Office initiative that sets “standards for verifying an individual’s 
identity” which is intended “to be used across Government”.38 According to the 
Government, the IAP aims to give citizens a secure and convenient way to sign in to 
Government services and requires the user to set up an “identity profile” to do things such 
as renew a driver’s licence or apply for a passport.39 In its written evidence, the 
Government explained that Identity Assurance Programme “includes four levels of identity 
assurance, of which the highest (Level 4) is dependent upon the use of biometrics”.40 
Unfortunately, it appears that the prospect of biometric verification has been announced 
without full consideration of how it might be implemented. Mr Marek Rejman-Greene, 
Home Office, told the Committee that “none” of the 25 exemplar services currently 
trialling the IAP required Level 4 verification. He clarified that this was “because the 
infrastructure [had] not been put in place as part of the [Identity Assurance Programme] 
scheme” before adding that “the plans for the much longer term of the identity assurance 
scheme [were] still being worked on”.41 
27. The Biometrics Commissioner pointed to the “value in someone looking forward and 
trying to identify what challenges are to come, what sort of governance arrangements are 
going to be needed”, adding that this was both “welcome” and “desirable”.42 The 
Government’s Foresight Programme would appear to be well-placed to provide this type of 
analysis. Established in 1994, Foresight is the Government Office for Science’s centre for 
34  Cabinet Office/Government Office for Science, "Horizon scanning programme: a new approach for policy making", 
12 July 2013 
35  Science and Technology Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Government horizon scanning, HC 703, para 
10 & para 25 
36  Q178 [the Minister] 
37  The Government (BIO0035) para 1.2 
38  The Government (BIO0035) para 1.10 
39  See for example: Government Digital Service, 'What is identity assurance?', accessed 12 January 2015  
40  The Government (BIO0035) para 1.10 
41  Q166 & Q169 
42  Q102 
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futures analysis. Its role is to help “the UK Government to think systematically about the 
future” in order to “ensure today’s decisions are robust to future uncertainties”.43 It is 
somewhat striking, then, that Foresight's 2013 report Future Identities: changing identities 
in the UK states on page 6 that biometric identities “were beyond the scope of the project” 
and therefore provides no evidence or advice to Government on biometrics.44  
28. The Foresight Programme’s 2013 report on Future Identities was a missed 
opportunity to examine biometrics and identify the main trends, and the associated 
challenges, that policy-makers in this field will face in the future. Indeed, it is 
astounding that biometrics was deemed ‘beyond the scope’ of an apparently forward-
looking piece of analysis when, three years earlier, the Government had been seeking to 
rely on biometrics as part of its identity card programme. We agree with the Biometrics 
Commissioner that this type of forward-looking analysis is desirable. 
29. We recommend that Foresight builds on the evidence gathered during this inquiry 
and undertakes a short, “Policy Futures” study to examine systematically the emerging 
issues, risks and opportunities arising from developments in biometrics. This analysis 
should be frequently reviewed in order to keep pace with rapid advances in biometrics 
and should be applied by the Government to assist its preparations for, and to help it 
shape, how this field may unfold in the future. 
The value of horizon scanning in the narrower context of biometrics used in law 
enforcement is considered in detail in Chapter 4. 
Scientific advice on biometrics 
30. Building on the work of our predecessors, we have taken a close interest throughout 
this Parliament in making sure that the institutional design of scientific advisory bodies 
facilitates the delivery of robust, evidence-based advice to Government. In its 2006 report, 
Identity Card Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence, a predecessor Science and 
Technology Committee noted that the Home Office had formalised its scientific and 
technical advice structures on biometrics by creating two scientific advisory committees: 
the Biometrics Experts Group and the Biometrics Assurance Group (BAG), with the latter 
chaired by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. In addition to these advisory 
committees, the Home Office Biometrics Centre of Expertise was established in 2005 and 
based at the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (now known as the Centre for 
Applied Science and Technology).45 
31. According to its 2007 annual report, the BAG provided “oversight and review” of the 
biometric elements of Government programmes and offered advice and “additional 
assurance” that the Government was making effective use of biometric technology.46 While 
the BAG primarily provided advice in the context of the Government’s identity cards 
programme, it was anticipated by the then Head of the Home Office Biometrics Centre of 
43  Research Councils UK, 'Foresight', accessed 12 January 2015  
44  Government Office for Science, Foresight Future Identities Final Project Report (January 2013) p 6 
45  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06, Identity Card 
Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence, HC 1032, paras 49 & 52 
46  Biometrics Assurance Group, Annual Report 2007 (July 2008), p4 
 
 
14    Current and future uses of biometric data and technologies 
 
Expertise, Mr Marek Rejman-Greene, that its remit would be broadened “to look at all the 
other related [Government] programmes using biometrics”, such as the UK visas 
programme.47  
32. Appearing in front of the Committee eight years later, Mr Rejman-Greene, now Senior 
Biometrics Adviser, Home Office, confirmed that the BAG’s remit had not, in fact, been 
broadened. Instead, he explained that it no longer existed:   
The biometrics assurance group was formed at the request of Parliament 
specifically to look at the national identity scheme. As that scheme was 
beginning to go into roll-out, the need for it began to be less pressing. In 
addition, the loss of one of the members of that biometrics assurance group 
[…] meant we were missing a considerable part of the industry inputs. The 
decision was made that that was no longer as pressing. There may well be a 
question about whether it should come back again.48 
In the absence of the BAG, scientific and technical advice to Government on biometrics 
has come from other sources. Both Andrew Tyrer, Innovate UK, and Mr Rejman-Greene 
called attention to the Biometrics Working Group, a “technical working group within 
Government which has access to specialists” who meet quarterly to talk “in a very informal 
format around the challenges of biometrics”.49 This appears to have evolved out of the 
original ‘Biometrics Experts Group’.50 Mr Alastair MacGregor, Biometrics Commissioner, 
and the Minister, also noted the work of the “forensics and biometric policy group” which, 
according to the Biometrics Commissioner, is “quite a large and wide-ranging group” 
concerned with “the development of a national strategy for both forensic science generally 
and biometrics”.51 
33. It was noticeable that the work of the forensics and biometric policy group was not 
directly referred to anywhere in the written evidence. We have come across this group 
before and have previously raised concerns about its lack of transparency and its failure to 
publish the minutes of its meetings.52 The 2010 Principles of scientific advice to Government 
(“the Principles”) point to the need for “clear roles and responsibilities”, “transparency and 
openness” and “independence” when providing scientific and engineering advice to 
Government, though their application is limited to:  
ministers and government departments, all members of Scientific Advisory 
Committees and Councils […] and other independent scientific and 
engineering advice. They do not apply to employed advisers, departmental 
47  Oral evidence taken on 22 March 2006, HC (2005-06) 1032, Q283 [Mr Rejman-Greene] 
48  Q147 
49  Q147; Q78 
50  Q147 
51  Q142 & Q102   
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Chief Scientific Advisers or other civil servants who provide scientific or 
analytical advice.53 
34. Without any information about the status of the forensics and biometric policy 
group—particularly with regard to its independence, or otherwise, from Government—it 
is not clear whether the Principles should apply. The Government predicted in its response 
to our 2013 report, Forensic Science, that the delivery of a forensics and biometrics strategy 
would “inevitably result” in the policy group “changing into a wider, more representative 
group” and added that “once this change [had] taken place the strategy and minutes of the 
new group [would] be published”.54 In the absence of a forensics and biometrics strategy 
(discussed in detail below), no such change has been forthcoming. Yet when confronted 
with the status quo, and asked whether it “would help public confidence” if the discussions 
of the group were “transparent”, the Minister agreed that was “broadly what should 
happen” though he offered no explanation as to why this had, so far, failed to occur.55 
35. Despite a previous assurance from the Government, given over 12 months ago, that 
the publication of the forensics and biometric policy group’s minutes was on the 
horizon, this has not occurred. As a result, the remit and status of the group, as well as 
what has been on its agenda, remain a mystery. This continuing lack of transparency in 
the delivery of scientific advice to Government on biometrics is unacceptable and goes 
against the Government’s own guidance, as set out in the 2010 Principles of scientific 
advice to Government. 
36. To improve its transparency, we recommend that the remit, membership and outputs 
of the forensics and biometric policy group should be placed in the public domain 
immediately. A commitment should also be made to the publication of the minutes of all 
future meetings, unless there are overriding reasons of national security for not doing so. 
The need for a Government biometrics strategy? 
37. We have longstanding concerns about the absence of a clear Government strategy and 
were therefore encouraged by the Government’s reassurance, given in response to our 2013 
report, Forensic Science, that it was “drawing up a biometric and forensic strategy to be 
completed by the end of the year [2013]”.56 It is now early 2015 and no strategy has been 
published. Instead, we have received a number of conflicting statements from the 
Government about its intentions.  
38. In its written evidence, the Government stated that the “Home Office [was] working 
with the police and other partners to develop a Forensics and Biometrics Strategy”, though 
53  Government Office for Science, Principles of scientific advice to government, March 2010. The Government’s recent 
Science and Innovation Strategy also points to the need for greater “openness” in science so that it becomes “less 
and less a closed community and more and more engaged with the world”. See HM Treasury, Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills, Our plan for growth: science and innovation, Cm 8980, December 2014, p 12 
54  The Government Response to the Second Report from the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
Session 2013-14 HC 610: Forensic science, Cm 8750, November 2013, p 17 
55  Q146 
56  Government Response to the Second Report from the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
Session 2013-14 HC 610: Forensic science. November 2013 Cm 8750, p 17 
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it did not indicate what it might include.57 We asked the Minister whether the biometrics 
strategy would take into account “the spectrum of applications” which we had heard about 
during our oral evidence sessions, “from access to schools or sports clubs through to issues 
around the criminal justice system” and whether it would “start to define where the limits 
are for applications within different Government sites”. The Minister simply replied 
“yes”.58 However, when he was asked about the “absence of a strategy that was promised”, 
he questioned the value of a national strategy, noting that “sometimes strategies are offered 
as a panacea and they do not always deliver”. He added that “one of the things” the “cross-
Government forensics and biometric policy group” was currently addressing was “whether 
there is a need for a strategy”.59 This was the first time we had heard it suggested that the 
Government biometrics and forensics strategy—a document we were previously told was 
due to be completed in late 2013—was now contingent on first establishing a clear “need”. 
39. Neither the Biometrics Commissioner, nor Chief Constable Sims, Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO), shared the Minister’s doubts about whether a Government 
strategy was necessary. Mr Alastair MacGregor, Biometrics Commissioner, told us that 
there was “value in a national strategy” in the field of biometrics.60 He went on to 
emphasise that the strategy had “not just been forgotten as something that needs to be 
developed”, rather “efforts [had] been going on to develop it” but that it had “not been 
easy”.61 Chief Constable Sims, ACPO, was also clear that there was still “some debate 
[required] to get to the point where we have an all-embracing national strategy”. However, 
he stressed that he “absolutely” needed:  
that to happen because a whole set of significant issues and risks sit within 
forensic science. One or two of those have surfaced today, but there are many 
others. The way those risks are mitigated and managed is through that 
national strategy.62 
40. In subsequent correspondence, the Minster confirmed that there was “general 
agreement among the [forensics and biometric policy] group that a national strategy would 
be helpful” but that there was “not yet a consensus view on what the strategy should focus 
on”. On this basis, the Minister had “asked officials to do more work to ensure […] an 
evidence based assessment of the issues which we need to collectively address”. The 
Minister anticipated this would take “three months, with the strategy itself to follow”.63 
When later pressed to clarify if this meant the strategy would be “unfinished business by 
the end of this Parliament”, the Minister was reluctant to give a date, simply adding “you 
may say that”.64  
57  The Government (BIO0035) para 3.4; Association of Chief Police Officers (BIO0036) para 5 
58  Q144 
59  Q142 
60  Q102 
61  Q122 
62  Q121 
63  The Government (BIO0038) 
64  Oral evidence taken on 14 January 2015, HC (2014-15) 758, Q152-Q153 
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41. The Government undertook to publish a joint forensics and biometrics strategy by 
the end of 2013. Over a year later, there is no strategy, no consensus on what it should 
include, and no expectation that it will be published in this Parliament. In its absence, 
there remains a worrying lack of clarity regarding if, and how, the Government intends 
to employ biometrics for the purposes of verification and identification and whether it 
has considered any associated ethical and legal implications. 
42. The Government should be developing a strategy that exploits emerging biometrics 
while also addressing public concerns about the security of personal data and the 
potential for its use and misuse, with particular reference to biometric data held by the 
state. 
43. We expect a comprehensive, cross-departmental forensics and biometrics strategy to 
be published by the Government no later than December 2015.   
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3 Development and implementation 
challenges 
44. This chapter explores some of the challenges both Government and industry may face 
when developing, and implementing, the trends outlined in the preceding chapter. 
Witnesses identified a blend of technical and privacy challenges and we strongly urge the 
Government to address these matters in a national biometrics strategy.  
The scientific foundations of biometric systems 
45. Biometric recognition is a “probabilistic science”.65 Unlike identification systems that 
rely on entering a password or PIN code, which is either correct or incorrect, biometric 
systems are affected by “intra-class variations”. These are differences between two 
templates of the same trait, from the same user, captured at different times. Intra-class 
variations arise from multiple sources: “body parts age, sensors get grimy, lighting 
conditions change”, all of which can introduce discrepancies between the same user’s 
biometric templates.66 Biometric systems have to tolerate this degree of variability which, in 
practice, raises the prospect of false accept, and false reject, errors.67 Dr Rice, Information 
Commissioner’s Office, noted that there “will be very different acceptable error rates” 
depending upon the context: “the accuracy you would want from Heathrow airport or law 
enforcement would be very different from an advertising board that predicts gender”.68 In 
theory, the “science of biometrics” focuses on examining, and ultimately minimising, these 
errors. Some witnesses, however, questioned the scientific foundations of biometric 
systems.  
46. Professors Black and NicDaeid stated that current biometric methods had “only 
minimal scientific grounding”. According to the Professors, “the underlying solid research” 
was frequently “underfunded or non-existent” which had a “direct impact on the 
robustness of the biometric and confidence in its utilisation and its effectiveness”.69 
Speaking to the Committee, Professor Black suggested that the “scientific base line” had 
been forgotten in the race “to meet commercial needs and security needs” and that it was 
now potentially time to “go back and give it a stronger foundation”.70 
47. However, Professor Louise Amoore, Durham University, suggested that the problem 
was not the underpinning science, per se, but rather how it was communicated, particularly 
once it became part of a biometric application. According to Professor Amoore, those 
writing “extraction algorithms and matching algorithms […] are quite candid that [they 
65  Q5 
66  Lockstep Consulting (BIO004) section 4 
67  A false accept error occurs when the acquired (or ‘live’) template from one individual, who is not in the system, is 
wrongly matched to a stored template from another individual and they are mistakenly allowed access. A false 
reject arises when an acquired template from one individual does not match the stored template for that individual 
and they are wrongly denied access.  
68  Q129 [Dr Rice] 
69  Professor Black and Professor NicDaeid (BIO0017) paras 3&9 
70  Q11 [Professor Black] 
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are] probabilistic” and see it as the responsibility of “the people who are buying the 
[biometric] system” to state “what sort of tolerance they have for the false acceptance rate 
versus the false reject rate”. She stressed that this “doubt in the science [was] present in the 
room when […] writing the code” but that such doubt was “lost by the time [the code was] 
part of the hardware technology being used".71 
Testing biometric systems 
48. Particular attention was drawn to the rigour of the testing regime and the additional 
impact this had on the reliability of the biometric. Before an algorithm is deployed in a 
‘real-world’ setting, its technical performance and accuracy (including the false accept and 
false reject error rates) are tested and evaluated on an artificial or simulated database 
containing biometric data samples. According to Innovate UK, testing biometric systems 
and measuring the “effectiveness of algorithms in different scenarios” is “difficult”.72 
Several witnesses, for example, commented on the challenges associated with establishing 
“a comprehensive dataset of subjects with an unbiased population to test against”.73 
Ben Fairhead, 3M, likened the process to that of a “drugs trial”. He explained that “to really 
prove the accuracy of a new biometric modality” it needed to be tested “with a large 
number of different people” which, he stated, was “quite expensive”; a point reiterated by 
Mr Marek Rejman-Greene, Home Office.74 Erik Bowman, Northrop Grumman, agreed 
and identified the lack of “availability” of large datasets for testing purposes as a potential 
barrier to advancing biometrics.75 
49. Others questioned the value of laboratory testing of biometric systems. Lockstep 
Consulting, for example, stated that:  
testing on artificial or simulated databases tells us only about the 
performance of a software package on that data. There is nothing in a 
technology test that can validate the simulated data as a proxy for the ‘real 
world’.76 
Recognising this issue, the Irish Council for Bioethics, in its 2009 report on Biometrics, 
considered “post-deployment testing and fine tuning” to be “critical if the system is to 
obtain the performance levels observed in the laboratory when operated in the real 
world”.77 
50. Concerns were also raised about the independence of the testing regime. 
Andrew Tyrer, Innovate UK, told the Committee that a “lot of the rigour that goes into 
testing” was “quite often fronted by the manufacturers themselves”. He went on to identify 
a “gap in the market […] around the testing of systems” on the grounds that there was 
71  Q12 [Professor Amoore] 
72  Innovate UK (BIO0029) para 10 
73  Innovate UK (BIO0029) para 10 
74  Q29 & Q148 
75  Q31 [Erik Bowman] 
76  Lockstep Consulting (BIO0004),section 5 
77  Irish Council for Bioethics, Biometrics: Enhancing Security or Invading Privacy? (October 2009), p 9 
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currently “not a lot of independent activity”.78 Ben Fairhead’s earlier analogy with “drugs 
trials” has particular relevance here since clinical trials are typically (though not 
exclusively) undertaken by commercial organisations aiming to develop a new product, 
rather than by an independent body. However, as we discussed in depth in our 2013 report, 
Clinical Trials, their conduct is regulated under the 2001 European Clinical Trials Directive 
which was implemented in the UK in 2004 through the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical 
Trials) Regulations.79 
51. In contrast, the testing of biometric systems is neither regulated nor universally 
standardised. Previous reviews of the technical literature on biometric device testing have 
highlighted a “wide variety of conflicting and contradictory testing protocols”, including 
“single organisations” producing “multiple tests, each using a different test method”.80 Our 
predecessors in 2006, for example, found that “industry claims” about the performance of 
biometric systems “varied widely”. They also drew attention to the role played by the 
Biometrics Assurance Group (BAG) in interpreting the outcomes of biometric testing, but, 
as noted above, the BAG no longer exists.81 
52. When we asked if the Home Office conducted any independent testing, or whether it 
relied on assurances from the manufacturer, Mr Rejman-Greene, Home Office, replied 
that there were “occasions when we do it ourselves and occasions when we monitor the 
way in which suppliers undertake the testing”. He added that “a standard was developed in 
the UK”, with the hope of moving “towards a European standard”. 82 
53. Exactly when such testing took place appeared to vary according to the system in 
question. For example, Mr Rejman-Greene highlighted the Immigration and Asylum 
Biometric System which, he told the Committee, had been “tested prior to delivery”.83 In 
contrast, Mr Alastair MacGregor, Biometrics Commissioner, reported that a “searchable 
national database of custody photographs” had “been put into operational use” by police 
forces in “the apparent absence of any very rigorous testing of the reliability of the facial 
matching technology that is being employed”.84 He added that the Home Office’s Centre 
for Applied Science and Technology was currently “looking at the algorithm applied to 
images on the police national database” and that, at the moment, the software was being 
used for “investigatory purposes only”: “No one is being prosecuted simply on the basis of, 
‘We’ve got an automatic match’”.85  
54. When biometric systems are employed by the state in ways that impact upon 
citizens’ civil liberties, it is imperative that they are accurate and dependable. Rigorous 
78  Q71 
79  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Third Report of Session 2013–14, Clinical Trials, HC 104, 
paras 13-15 
80  A. J. Mansfield & J.L. Wayman, Best Practices in Testing and Reporting Performance of Biometric Devices, NPL Report 
CMSC14/02, August 2002, p1 
81  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06, Identity Card 
Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence, HC 1032, paras 18 & 51 
82  Q148; see also British Standards Institution (BIO0020) Annex 
83  Q148 
84  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0027) para 8.2 
85  Q93; Q97 
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testing and evaluation must therefore be undertaken prior to, and after, deployment, 
and details of performance levels published. It is highly regrettable that testing of the 
‘facial matching technology’ employed by the police does not appear to have occurred 
prior to the searchable national database of custody photographs going live. While we 
recognise that testing biometric systems is both technically challenging and expensive, 
this does not mean it can be neglected. 
55. When testing does occur, the continued use of a variety of testing protocols by 
suppliers makes it difficult to analyse and compare, with any degree of confidence, the 
performance of different systems. Following the abolition of the Biometrics Assurance 
Group, it is unclear who is responsible for interpreting the outcomes of biometric 
testing for the Government. 
56. The Government should explain, in its response to this report, why the facial 
matching technology employed by the police was not rigorously tested prior to being put 
into operational use. We further recommend that the Government details what steps it is 
taking to encourage suppliers of biometric systems to comply with established UK testing 
standards. 
The facial recognition software used by police, and best practice standards, are both 
considered in detail in Chapter 4. 
Proportionality 
57. Ensuring that a biometric system is proportionate—that a balance is struck between 
society’s need for the system and an individual’s privacy rights—was identified as both a 
“critical issue” and a challenge that Government and industry needed to address.86 When 
analysing proportionality, the European Commission’s Data Protection Working Party 
identified a number of considerations, including whether the biometric system was 
“essential for satisfying that need rather than being the most convenient or cost effective”, 
as well as whether “the resulting loss of privacy” was “proportional to any anticipated 
benefit”. It added that if the benefit was “relatively minor”, such as an “increase in 
convenience or a slight cost saving”, then the “loss of privacy” was “not appropriate”.87  
58. Our witnesses broadly agreed with this assessment. Dr Richard Guest, University of 
Kent, stated that citizens should only be asked for their “high value identity biometrics as 
access keys to high value services”.88 Attention was drawn to the example of schools, where 
biometric applications have been employed as part of cashless catering systems and to 
borrow a library book. The Biometrics Institute recommended that schools should seek 
“less invasive […] solutions to those issues of library books, school lunches, attendance and 
bus tickets”.89 Emma Carr, Big Brother Watch, concurred, noting that schools often “could 
not give a direct reason as to why it was necessary for them to have [a biometric system] 
86  Biometrics Institute Limited (BIO0003), para 4.3 
87  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (European Commission), Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric 
technologies (April 2012) p 8 
88  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 9 
89  Biometrics Institute Limited (BIO0003), para 4.3 
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rather than another system”.90 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 does include a 
requirement for schools to notify and obtain consent before processing a child’s biometric 
information. It also states that schools “must ensure” that reasonable alternative 
arrangements are provided for pupils who do not use automated biometric recognition 
systems.91 However, there is nothing in the Act which requires a school’s use of biometric 
systems to be proportionate, nor is there any reference to proportionality in the 
accompanying guidance produced by the Department for Education.92  
59. In its written evidence, the Government stated that biometric systems should 
demonstrate “a lawful purpose, a pressing need and proportionality”.93 When questioned 
how the Government ensured that these criteria were met, the Minister replied that it was 
“aided by the independent offices of the biometrics and information commissioners, the 
science advisers within the Home Office and a science council”, adding that these 
“mechanisms” enabled things to be kept “under review”.94 However, Big Brother Watch, 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and Mr Rejman-Greene, Home Office, also 
pointed to the value of conducting a “privacy impact assessment” (PIA) at the outset of a 
project to determine “what privacy implications any scheme may have, as well as 
alternative, potentially less intrusive methods of achieving the same goal”.95  
60. We have previously recommended that PIAs “should be applied to all policies that 
collect, retain or process personal data”.96 This recommendation would cover biometrics; 
according to the ICO, biometric data is “a measure of a biological property” and given that 
“it can often be used to generate unique identifiers, it will often be classed as personal 
data”.97 Though the ICO updated its ‘Code of Practice’ for ‘Conducting privacy impact 
assessments’ in 2014, PIAs are not, at present, mandatory.98 Instead, the Minister told us 
that “the operation of privacy impact assessments” was an area “currently under review”.99 
61. We welcome the Government's commitment to the principle of proportionality 
when it is considering implementing a biometric application. However, we are not 
convinced that the Government has clear steps in place—such as conducting 
mandatory privacy impact assessments—to measure consistently whether or not a 
specific biometric application is proportionate. 
We revisit privacy impact assessments later in this chapter. 
90  Q54 [Emma Carr] 
91  Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 26 (7) 
92  Department for Education, Protection of Biometric Information of Children in Schools: Advice for proprietors, 
governing bodies, head teachers, principals and school staff (December 2012) 
93   The Government, (BIO0035) para 1.2 
94  Q178 [the Minister] 
95  Big Brother Watch (BIO0002); Information Commissioner’s Office, (BIO0009) para 19; Q178 [Marek Rejman-Greene] 
96  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2014–15, Responsible Use of Data, 
HC 245, para 29 
97  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 23 
98  Information Commissioner's Office, Conducting privacy impact assessments: code of practice, (February 2014) 
99  Q173 
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Public attitudes 
62. We were repeatedly told that public attitudes towards biometric systems were largely 
negative. According to Sir John Adye, Identity Assurance Systems, public distrust of 
biometrics remained “prevalent in countries like the UK” while Professor van Zoonen, 
IMPRINTS, identified biometrics as “the most controversial and worrying of all means of 
authentication” among the British public.100 This absence of public “faith and trust” was 
highlighted as a key challenge facing both the Government and industry, and a “primary 
inhibitor” to the development and implementation of biometric systems.101 Pointing to 
events in the United States, for example, Northrop Grumman noted how the biometric 
industry had “been plagued with programmes that [had] proven the technology” but were 
discontinued “due to public outcries against misuse of its biometric images”.102  
63. Reasons given for the public’s misgivings included concerns about intrusions into both 
their ‘physical privacy’ and their ‘informational privacy’.103 Drawing on the results of a 
survey conducted by her research group, Professor van Zoonen stated that public anxiety 
centred on at least three areas: first, “strong cultural associations” of biometrics with “state 
control and surveillance”; second, fears about losing control over personal data, with data 
subsequently being “lost or abused” and third, concerns about whether personal data was 
acquired and stored securely.104  
64. For some witnesses, distrust of biometric systems also stemmed from the nature of the 
data collected and its intrinsic connection to the individual. Sir John Adye was of the view 
that biometric data was inherently more valuable than a password or PIN code because of 
its “absolute tie to the physical characteristics of people”.105 Professor Sue Black, University 
of Dundee, echoed Sir John’s point, noting that “one’s security, one’s identity, is one of the 
things that people probably hold most dear to themselves, because it is the representation 
of self”.106  
65. Other witnesses suggested that an ongoing lack of communication about biometrics 
with the public was responsible for growing “misconceptions”.107 Dr Richard Guest, 
University of Kent, raised concerns that while the capabilities of biometric technologies 
had advanced, citizens had “not been brought along on the journey”.108 Lockstep 
Consulting, for example, pointed to the lack of discussion by “technologists and policy 
makers of the exceptions in this field, such as individuals who, for no fault of their own, 
100  Sir John Adye (BIO0031) para 4.1; IMPRINTS (Identity Management – Public Responses to Identity Technologies and 
Services) (BIO0005) para 1 
101  Q1 [Professor Black]; Q31 [Sir John Adye] 
102  Northrop Grumman (BIO0030) para 4v 
103  The Information Commissioner’s Office defines physical privacy as the ability of a person to “maintain their own 
physical space or solitude” while informational privacy is understood to be the ability of a person to control, edit, 
manage and delete information about themselves and to decide how and to what extent such information is 
communicated to others. See Information Commissioner’s Office, Conducting privacy impact assessments code of 
practice (February 2014), p 6 
104  IMPRINTS (BIO0005) paras 3&4 
105  Q36 [Sir John Adye] 
106  Q7 
107  International Biometrics & Identification Association (BIO0032) para IV 
108  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 6 
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cannot enrol in a given biometric” and thus whether biometrics may introduce, or 
exacerbate existing, inequalities.109 Professor Juliet Lodge, Biometrics Institute, agreed that 
the Government had not been “engaging properly” with the public about biometrics since 
the scrapping of its ID card scheme in 2010. She added that, to date, the public had “not 
been terribly well informed about what a biometric is or how we can use biometrics”.110  
66. However, Dr Simon Rice, Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), told us that, 
while “public reaction to ID cards was not very positive,” he did not think that the public 
had “shied away from biometrics or somehow been turned off”.111 Instead, witnesses 
highlighted that there had been “a huge expansion in more passive forms of take-up” of 
biometrics and a corresponding absence of “open dialogue and transparency when 
communicating with the public about biometric technology”.112 Mr Alastair MacGregor, 
Biometrics Commissioner, indicated that, in his view, “more people” were “concerned 
about Government use” of biometrics than they were about commercial uses.113 
67. To establish and maintain public confidence in biometric systems, a number of 
witnesses stated that their development, operation and management should be transparent 
and proportionate.114 Dr Rice agreed, adding that the ICO had a role to play in educating 
“policy makers and Government, as well as members of the public” through its “guidance, 
blogs and websites”.115 When questioned about the Government’s efforts to maintain 
public confidence in biometrics, the Minister replied that “the more discussion and the 
more awareness there is, the better”, adding that the Government were “looking at ways to 
do that”. The Minister, however, stressed that Government was only part of the solution 
and identified Parliament, as well as the media and civil society, as needing “to engage and 
have a far wider debate about the issues”.116 
68. We have seen in the past how public trust in emerging technologies may be severely 
damaged in the absence of full and frank debate. Despite growth in commercial and 
Government applications of biometrics, the Government appears to have made little 
effort to engage with the public regarding the increasing use of their biometric data, 
and what this means for them, since the scrapping of the Government’s ID card scheme 
in 2010. This is exactly the type of issue that the Government’s joint forensics and 
biometrics strategy should have addressed. 
69. We recommend that the Government sets out, in its response to this report, how it 
plans to facilitate an open, public debate around the growth of biometric systems. 
109  Lockstep Consulting (BIO0004) section 2; see also Dr Edgar Whitley (BIO0025) para 15 
110  Q10, Q1 [Professor Lodge] 
111  Q112 
112  Q1 [Professor Amoore]; Q1 [Professor Lodge]; Pippa King (BIO0028) para 5 
113  Q113 
114  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 9; Lockstep Consulting (BIO0004) section 5; Biometrics 
Institute Limited (BIO0003) 
115  Q125 
116  Q181 
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Data storage and system security 
70. Recent “breaches of security”, including the “Snowden incident”, have made the public 
increasingly sceptical about who has access to their biometric data and whether it is stored 
securely.117 Research Councils UK was clear that establishing public confidence in “the 
storage and access arrangements around their biometric data” was key to ensuring greater 
public acceptance of biometrics.118   
71. Unlike a password or PIN code, an individual’s biometric characteristic cannot easily 
be revoked or reissued if it is compromised. Giving evidence in 2006 to our predecessors, 
Professor Martyn Thomas stated that the theft of an individual’s biometrics created a 
“security nightmare” whereby somebody's biometrics were “no longer available to them to 
authenticate themselves for the rest of their lives”.119 It is, therefore, paramount that 
templates of biometric traits are stored securely. Erik Bowman, Northrop Grumman, 
explained that secure storage was possible: 
When the data are […] not being used or in the process of being 
authenticated, they can be encrypted. The template […] is a small 
representation of the image itself. It is fairly hard to reconstruct into the 
actual image. The images are kept separate along with the security scheme 
and can be encrypted.120  
72. However, there was a divergence of opinion between Government and industry as to 
whether security was adequately integrated into biometric systems. According to Northrop 
Grumman, securing biometric systems was “all too often […] an afterthought” and failed 
to be designed and planned from the outset “due to a lack of clear requirements or cost 
constraints”.121 Erik Bowman, Northrop Grumman, commented that “agencies will not 
think all the way through a complete requirement that states you must protect the data in 
such a way” and will instead rely on “the systems integrator [to] figure out how to do 
that”.122 The Minister disagreed with this assessment, countering that it was, in fact, the 
“private sector that might bolt on security at the end of the process” adding that the 
Government “bolts on security right at the beginning of the process”. He continued:  
security is probably far more hard-wired into every process of what 
Government does, particularly because it is dealing with national security 
issues, and I think people could have more confidence in that particular area 
of security of data. The private sector probably has some catching up to do.123 
73. Drawing attention to the specific example of DNA and fingerprints, Mr Alastair 
MacGregor, Biometrics Commissioner, concurred that there was a “difference between 
117  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 7 
118  Research Councils UK (BIO0033) para 9 
119  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005–06, Identity Card 
Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence, HC 1032, para 131 
120  Q41 [Erik Bowman]; see also National Security Alliance (BIO0007) 
121  Northrop Grumman (BIO0030) para 5 
122  Q39 
123  Q182 
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commercial organisations and what actually happens in Government” and pointed to the 
“huge attention” paid to “the security of that information” by Government, including 
restricting access to databases, like the DNA database.124 
74. Dr Simon Rice, Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), clarified that the “standard 
in the Data Protection Act is that appropriate security measures must be taken”, adding the 
“ideal” was that:  
if that biometric data is breached in some way, it should not matter to the 
individual. You should be able to re-enrol a person with a new biometric, and 
that template should not be able to be used in some other kind of system to 
gain access.125 
When pressed to outline what steps the ICO takes to ensure the standard set out in the 
Data Protection Act is adhered to, Dr Rice stated that “it would be up to the institutions 
rolling out the biometric system to make sure they are storing it in that way”, adding that it 
was not “in the legislation that the data controller must write to us for approval before they 
roll out a particular system”.126 The Data Protection Act is examined in further detail in 
Chapter 4. 
75. High profile cyber-attacks and data loss incidents have undermined the public’s 
confidence in the ability of both Government and industry to store their data securely. 
Security considerations should never be an “afterthought” or an optional extra. We 
welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the security of the Government’s biometric 
systems is “bolted on” at the beginning of the design process. However, such assurances 
alone will do little to diminish the public's concerns while data losses continue to occur. 
76. We recommend that, in its response to this report, the Government outlines the steps 
taken to mitigate the risk of loss, or unauthorised release, of the biometric data that it 
holds. 
77. Current legislation places responsibility on the institution rolling out a (biometric) 
system to ensure that appropriate security measures are in place when storing personal 
data. However, we are concerned that there is no proactive, independent oversight of 
whether this is occurring. Conducting a privacy impact assessment at the outset of all 
projects and policies that collect, retain or process personal data would help to ensure 
that those implementing a biometric system are fully aware of, and compliant with, the 
necessary security measures. 
78. We therefore reiterate the recommendation made in our report, the Responsible Use 
of Data, that privacy impact assessments should be conducted at the outset of all projects 
and policies that collect, retain or process personal data, including biometric data. 
124  Q116 [Alastair MacGregor] 
125  Q114 
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Function creep 
79. Templates of biometric traits may be stored on a centralised database or on portable 
media, such as a smart card. Large, centralised databases are essential if biometrics are to be 
used for the purposes of identification (as opposed to verification) yet, as the Irish Council 
for Bioethics reports, they are often criticised because of the potential for “function 
creep”.127 The European Commission describes function creep as “technology and 
processes introduced for one purpose [and] extended to other purposes which were not 
discussed or agreed upon at their implementation”.128  
80. The Biometrics Institute stated that one of the “major threats to privacy” is the 
“potential of re-purposing and function-creep and, especially, data linkage, both by 
governments and private companies”.129 The European Commission Data Protection 
Working Party expressed a similar view when reviewing developments in biometrics. In 
2012 the Working Party voiced concerns that “the higher technical potential of new 
computer systems” raised the “risk of data being used against their original purpose”. This 
included the “identification of individuals without their knowledge” and the linking of 
biometric data with information from other databases in ways that facilitated profiling; 
both of which were emerging trends identified in Chapter 2.130 
81. Professor Louise Amoore, Durham University, described how these trends had 
changed the status quo, particularly around consent. Under the Data Protection Act, a 
prerequisite to using biometric data (or any ‘personal data’) is the requirement that the 
individual “is fully informed about the purposes of the processing”.131 Professor Amoore 
stated that less than “five years ago legislators could safely assume that a citizen would 
know, and be able to meaningfully consent to, the point of biometric data collection and 
processing”.132 Now, according to Professor Amoore, the situation had shifted since 
biometric data could be “analysed in conjunction with a vast array of other available ‘big 
data’, not all of which belongs to known or identifiable individuals”.133 She cautioned that 
the “linkage to the biometric makes all sorts of things possible”, adding that this required a 
rethinking of “consent, and to what extent we can now reasonably say that someone has 
given their consent”.134  
82. As Professors Black and NicDaeid explained, a further part of the “difficulty arises from 
knowing the future importance of the data we collect today”. For example a: 
volunteer in a research project may be willing today to allow a photograph of 
the back of their hand to be taken, with developments in technology and with 
127  Irish Council for Bioethics, Biometrics: Enhancing Security or Invading Privacy? (October 2009), p 6 
128  European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre, Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact 
on Society. For the European Parliament Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE), Executive Summary, 2005, p 7 
129  Biometrics Institute Limited (BIO0003) para 1 
130  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (European Commission), Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric 
technologies, (April 2012), p 17 
131  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 24 
132  Professor Amoore (BIO0006) para 1.1 
133  Professor Amoore (BIO0006) para 4.1 
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previously unknown linkage capabilities, there may be very private 
information stored there which can now be released and utilised in ways 
never intended or imagined.135 
83. In addition to concerns about consent, both the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO) and Professor Amoore warned that combining big data with biometric data could 
reduce the degree of human input into decision making and potentially give rise to: 
powerful systems making decisions about individuals based solely on their 
facial markers, genetic data or other biometric detail in a manner which is 
incompatible with the original purpose.136 
For Professor Amoore, this represented an area where there needed “to be greater public 
debate about the relationship between machine recognition, algorithmic decisions and the 
intervention of a human person”.137 When questioned if “at least some human 
involvement” was being “built in” to the Government’s Identity Assurance Programme if a 
biometric was required, Mr Rejman-Greene, Home Office, replied that he did not know 
“because the plans for the much longer term of the identity assurance scheme [were] still 
being worked on”.138 He did, however, note that if there was “an automated decision that 
affected the individual, it might well be counter to one of the Data Protection Act 
requirements, […] that you should not take that decision in a purely automated way”.139 
84. Processing personal data (including biometric data) in ways that are incompatible with 
the purposes specified when it was collected breaches the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act. The Committee previously stressed in its report, the Responsible Use of Data, that we 
consider it vital that both the public and private sectors effectively communicate how they 
intend to use the data of individuals. In our opinion, under no circumstances should the 
state roll out a biometric system that does not provide any scope for human 
intervention. 
85. In the interests of greater transparency of data collection and use, we reiterate our 
earlier recommendation; namely that the Government drives the development of a set of 
information standards that companies can sign up to, under which they commit to 
explain to individuals their plans for the use of personal data (including biometric data), 
in clear, concise and simple terms. 
Unsupervised systems 
86. Additional concerns about system security were raised in the specific context of mobile, 
‘unsupervised’ biometric systems.140 Sir John Adye, Identity Assurance Systems, drew a 
135  Professor Black and Professor NicDaeid (BIO0017) para 12 
136  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 21; see also Professor Amoore (BIO0006) para 2.2. It should be 
noted that a specific example of this currently occurring was not provided. 
137  Q5 
138  Q169 
139  Q168 
140  The UK Cards Association (BIO0011) para 8; Identity Assurance Systems (BIO0031) para 4.1; Professor Nixon and 
Professor Kittler (BIO0010) para 7.1 
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comparison with using an ATM. He noted that while the ATM would “be supervised by 
the bank in some way”, there was “no physical supervision of the system” if you were 
instead using “your smartphone, or even your PC at home”.141 According to Sir John, the 
development of biometric systems that rested “outside the control of the relying party” 
necessitated “the right kind of security and cryptographic techniques designed into the 
systems which are on the phones themselves”. Sir John, however, was not convinced that 
this was currently occurring and questioned:  
what happens to my personal data when I use them on a smartphone for 
proving my identity. Is Google going to use that data also to target 
advertising at me? Is some other commercial company or maybe some 
hostile foreign Government going to use it to target me in some other way? I 
don’t know. We need to find ways of getting that kind of system properly 
organised.142 
87. One way of getting “properly organised”, suggested by Sir John, would be through the 
development of international standards. According to Sir John and Dr Peter Waggett, BSI, 
standards for the use of biometrics on “mobile phones and any devices outside the control 
of the relying party” were being developed, though both witnesses acknowledged that the 
process took time and was not easy since it required “acceptance and buy-in from all of the 
different nations that are represented at the ISO level”.143 The role of both national and 
international standards, including adherence to them, is considered in further detail in 
Chapter 4.   
141  Q41 [Sir John Adye] 
142  Q44 
143  Q45 & Q56. ISO stands for the ‘International Organization for Standardization’ 
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4 Legislation and standards 
88. The evidence we received on function creep, the re-purposing of data and unsupervised 
biometric systems raised broader questions about whether current legislation governing 
the ownership of biometric data, and who can collect, store and use it, remains effective. 
This chapter addresses these questions and pays particular attention to the use of facial 
recognition software by the police on photographs that were taken in custody. This matter 
was highlighted to us by both the Biometrics Commissioner and the Information 
Commissioner’s Office. 
Fit for purpose? 
89. Witnesses disagreed about the effectiveness of the legislation governing the use of 
biometric data, including the Data Protection Act (DPA). As the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) explained, the “DPA governs the use of ‘personal data’”, 
namely “data which relates to a living individual who can be identified from that data, 
either directly or indirectly”. Since biometric data is “a measure of a biological property” 
that “can often be used to generate unique identifiers” the ICO noted that “it will often be 
classed as personal data” with its use “governed by the Data Protection Act”.144 
90. Dr Richard Guest, University of Kent, stated that, in light of many of the challenges 
posed by developments in biometrics, “current legislation” was “not fit for purpose”.145 
Some witnesses suggested that this could be resolved through revisions to the DPA. For 
example, Professor Louise Amoore, Durham University, commented that a “revised Data 
Protection Act capable of keeping pace with the capacities of contemporary data analytics” 
was required. She proposed treating all biometric data as “sensitive personal data” since “it 
can reveal things relating to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation” as a change that she wished 
to see on the grounds that, “different rules apply to processing, storage and so on”.146  
91. Others, however, felt that it was time to start again. Professor Sue Black, University of 
Dundee, did not think that the DPA could be changed or amended in order to cope with 
advances in biometrics. Instead she stated that a “whole new outlook” was required since 
biometrics was “running ahead of our capability to manage it”.147 3M went further and 
questioned whether legislation could ever keep pace with advances in technology.148 It 
anticipated that as biometric technologies “diffuse down” to smaller, non-government 
entities, the Government’s influence in this sphere would “disappear” to the extent that it 
would “prove almost impossible to enforce legislation introduced to deal with the 
situation”.149  
144  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) paras 23 & 4 
145  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 15 
146  Q16-Q17 
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92. The Government disagreed, arguing that since the DPA was “a principle-based 
framework of statutory requirements” it should “remain relevant and applicable in the face 
of rapid technological advance”.150 The ICO concurred stating that the DPA was 
“technology-neutral and adequately flexible to ensure that biometric data can be processed 
in compliance with the essential legal obligations and safeguards”.151 While recognising 
Professor Amoore’s concern that biometric data might reveal so-called “sensitive personal 
data”, such as an “individual’s race, ethnic origin or health condition”, the ICO considered 
it to be “debatable […] whether information with the mere potential to reveal somebody’s 
race, for example, is in itself sensitive personal data”.152 The Minister, therefore, did not 
believe that a “general review” of the DPA was currently necessary, though he remained 
“open to it”. 153  
93. We agree with the Government and the Information Commissioner’s Office that, as 
a principle-based framework, the Data Protection Act 1998 should provide adequate 
regulation in the face of developments in biometric technologies. However, we are 
mindful of the concerns raised by experts in the field, such as Professor Sue Black, and 
therefore recommend that the Government keeps this matter under review. 
Facial recognition and the retention of photographs by the police 
94. Facial recognition systems can be used for verification (confirming a person is who 
they claim to be) or identification purposes (discovering who an otherwise unknown 
person is). In theory, the use of facial recognition for identification could assist the police in 
their investigations. However, there was a persistent lack of clarity about whether facial 
recognition was currently used by the police in this mode and particularly if it was being 
applied to photographs taken in custody.  
95. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) described facial recognition as “a less 
well developed area of biometrics”, though it noted that police have taken photographs of 
suspects during the custody process “for many years”. ACPO stated that these images had 
recently “been held digitally” and were “capable of being used within the emerging science 
of facial recognition”.154 However, ACPO did not state in its written evidence if this 
“capability” was operational. Speaking to the Committee, Chief Constable Chris Sims, 
ACPO, clarified that he was:  
not aware of forces using facial image software at the moment. There are 
certainly lots of discussions and there has been some piloting, but from my 
perspective the technology is not yet at the maturity where it could be 
deployed, so issues as to how it is used sit as a future debate rather than a 
current one.155 
150  The Government (BIO0035) para 2.4 
151  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 23 
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96. Mr Alastair MacGregor, Biometrics Commissioner, told us that he was “slightly 
surprised by some of what [Chief Constable Sims] has said”: it was his “understanding that 
12 million-plus custody photographs” had been “uploaded to the PND [Police National 
Database] and that facial recognition software [was] being applied to them”.156 When asked 
to respond to Mr MacGregor’s comments, Chief Constable Sims replied that he too was 
“surprised” by what he had heard, adding that he “certainly did not think it was an 
operational reality” before stressing that facial recognition was not his “area of specialty”.157  
97. Compounding this confusion was an apparent ‘gap’ in the legislation regarding the 
retention of images, and the use of facial recognition software, by the police. The 
Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) stated that the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
“does not cover photographs” and that there was “no specific legislation covering their 
retention or their use”.158 The Biometrics Commissioner echoed the ICO’s point and 
questioned how “appropriate” it was for the police to put “a searchable database of custody 
photographs” into “operational use” in the absence of any “proper and effective regulatory 
regime […] beyond that provided for in the Data Protection Act 1998”.159  He added that 
the custody photographs loaded on to the PND included “those of hundreds of thousands 
of individuals who have never been charged with, let alone convicted of, an offence”.160 
98. The deficiencies of current legislation and policy relating to the retention of images by 
the police were clearly highlighted to the Government in 2012 in R (RMC and FJ) v MPS 
(Metropolitan Police Service). The two claimants, RMC and FJ, were arrested but 
subsequently not convicted of an offence and sought the destruction of their custody 
photographs, fingerprints and DNA samples. The Court ruled that the “defendant's 
existing policy concerning the retention of custody photographs (namely, to apply the 
MoPI Code of Practice and the MoPI guidance)” was “unlawful”.161 Rather than require 
“the immediate destruction of the claimants’ photographs”, the Court allowed “the 
defendant a reasonable further period within which to revise the existing policy” while 
clarifying that a “reasonable further period” was to be “measured in months, not years”.162  
Over two and half years later, no revised policy has been published. However, when giving 
evidence, the Minister announced a new “a policy review of the statutory basis for the 
retention of facial images” on the grounds that “the chief constable, the police and the 
Home Office” all accepted that “the current governance of the data being held is not 
sufficiently covered” by existing policy and legislation.163 
99. We are concerned that it has taken over two and half years for the Government to 
respond to the High Court ruling that the existing policy concerning the retention of 
156  Q91 
157  Q92 [Chief Constable Sims] 
158  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 32 
159  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0027) para 5 & 8.2 
160  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0027) para 9 
161  MoPI stands for the Management of Police Information. The Code of Practice on the Management of Police 
Information was issued by the Secretary of State in July 2005 under the powers of s.39A of the Police Act 1996. By 
s.39A(7) of that Act, chief officers are required to have regard to the Code in discharging any function to which the 
Code relates.  
162  R (RMC and FJ) v Metropolitan Police Service [2012] EWHC 1681 
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custody photographs was “unlawful”. Furthermore, we were dismayed to learn that, in the 
known absence of an appropriate governance framework, the police have persisted in 
uploading custody photographs to the Police National Database, to which, subsequently, 
facial recognition software has been applied.  
100. We fully appreciate the positive impact that facial recognition software could have on 
the detection and prevention of crime. However, it is troubling that the governance 
arrangements were not fully considered and implemented prior to the software being 
‘switched on’. This appears to be a further example of a lack of oversight by the 
Government where biometrics is concerned; a situation that could have been avoided had a 
comprehensive biometrics strategy been developed and published. While we welcome the 
Minister’s announcement of a review of the statutory basis for the retention of facial 
images, we are concerned that similar issues could arise in the years ahead relating to voice 
and gait recognition, and possibly other biometric traits. 
101. To avoid a biometric application once again being put into operational use in the 
absence of a robust governance regime, we recommend that:  
a) the forensics and biometric policy group is reconstituted with a clearer mandate to 
analyse how developments in biometrics may compromise the effectiveness of current 
policy and legislation;  
b) as recommended in paragraphs 35 and 36, the reconstituted group should operate 
in a transparent manner, be open to receiving inputs from external bodies and publish 
its outputs; 
c) the Government, police and the Biometrics Commissioner should use these 
outputs to identify gaps in the legislation to be addressed ahead of any new biometric 
application going live. 
The Biometrics Commissioner 
102. The role of Biometrics Commissioner was created by the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012. That Act established a new regime to govern the retention and use by the police in 
England and Wales of DNA samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints. Mr MacGregor was 
clear that his statutory responsibilities as Biometrics Commissioner related “only to DNA 
and fingerprints” though he acknowledged that the term ‘biometric data’ was “usually 
thought to include, among other things, facial images and voice patterns”. He also noted 
that “no other commissioner or regulator” appeared to have a remit which specifically 
covered the use of facial and voice recognition by the police.164  
103. We put it to Mr MacGregor that it appeared “a bit odd that the Office of the 
Biometrics Commissioner [did] not cover all potential biometrics”.165 While initially 
stressing that he was “keen not to empire-build”166 Mr MacGregor later stated in 
correspondence with the Committee that:  
164  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0027) para 6 
165  Q95 
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strong arguments could be advanced in favour of the proposition that the 
jurisdiction of the Biometrics Commissioner should be extended so as to 
cover the police use of custody photographs (and possibly other biometric 
material) and that that would be a much more sensible arrangement than the 
appointment of some new or separate Commissioner to provide independent 
oversight.167 
When asked if the Government had considered extending the responsibilities of the 
Biometrics Commissioner, the Minister replied that he was “going to look at this”, adding 
that he had “heard what the biometrics commissioner said, and we have launched the 
review. I can say to the Committee that the role of the biometrics commissioner in 
response to facial images will be a key aspect of the review”.168 In subsequent 
correspondence with the Committee, the Minister stated that, in the longer-term, “the 
future provision of biometrics capability for at least the police, immigration, borders and 
security needs to be more coherent and integrated”. He continued that the “governance 
and oversight of any such integration […] will be given careful consideration, particularly 
in relation to the role of the Biometrics Commissioner”.169 
104. We agree with the Biometrics Commissioner that there is value in the provision of 
day-to-day, independent oversight of police use of biometrics and that such oversight 
should extend beyond fingerprints and DNA. We also agree that broadening the 
Commissioner’s responsibilities would be a “more sensible” approach than establishing 
a new, separate commissioner covering other biometric traits. 
105. We therefore recommend that the statutory responsibilities of the Biometrics 
Commissioner be extended to cover, at a minimum, the police use and retention of facial 
images. The implications of widening the Commissioner’s role beyond facial images 
should also be fully explored, costed and the findings published. We further recommend 
that the Government clarifies where the operational boundaries lie between the 
Biometrics Commissioner and the Forensic Science Regulator. 
National and international standards 
106. We received several submissions, particularly from industry, which argued that 
legislation and regulation could only go so far in ensuring that biometric systems were 
operated in ways that were “reliable, accurate and secure”, particularly when their 
development and use might “transcend territorial jurisdiction”.170 It was therefore 
suggested that ‘standards’ were also necessary. The British Standards Institute (BSI) 
describes a standard as “a document defining best practice, established by consensus” that 
is “voluntary and separate from legal and regulatory systems”.171 Biometrics standards 
currently exist at the British, European and International level and address topics such as: 
167  Biometrics Commissioner (BIO0037) 
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• modes of biometric system including fingerprints, facial recognition, voice, finger 
or palm 
• vein and iris recognition 
• interoperability and communication of biometric data 
• methods for protecting against fraud and misrepresentation 
• usability and accessibility of biometric systems 
• society and cross-jurisdictional issues 
• privacy, security and consumer protection.172 
107. Standards can fulfil a number of complementary functions. The Government, for 
example, anticipated that:  
open standards for data formatting, storage, communication and access 
[would] form a critical element of the infrastructure for biometric 
information, with benefits for interoperability across Government and 
internationally allowing ease of access whilst maintaining security and data 
assurance, and increasing the efficiency of existing systems.173 
According to Mr Marek Rejman-Greene, Home Office, having open standards also:  
enables all the details of how those systems operate to be out in the open. It 
allows for innovation, so you know the constraints within which to innovate; 
and it means, therefore, that UK companies can bid for parts of the systems 
that relate to the biometric component.174 
108. Some concern was voiced about how difficult it would be to persuade commercial 
companies to adhere to open standards. Pointing to “the use of mobile platform and cloud-
based systems” for biometrics, Dr Richard Guest, University of Kent, reported that “large 
technology manufacturers” were adopting “proprietary standards thereby preventing 
third-party use of data” which could limit new entrants to the market.175 However, in the 
case of government biometric systems, Sir John Adye, Identity Assurance Systems, 
predicted that “with major international industries competing for government contracts”, 
it would “be possible to encourage compliance with best practice”.176 Speaking as a supplier 
of biometric technologies, Ben Fairhead, 3M, agreed with Sir John’s assessment. He 
stressed that 3M’s systems had:  
to be [standards compliant] because Governments demand that the sorts of 
systems we supply are standards compliant. The systems we supply need to 
talk to other systems within a country, and sometimes between countries, so 
172  British Standards Institution (BIO0020) para 4.2. 
173  The Government (BIO0035) para 5.3 
174  Q179 
175  Super-Identity Project, University of Kent (BIO0015) para 12 
176  Identity Assurance Systems (BIO0031) para 4.1 
 
 
36    Current and future uses of biometric data and technologies 
 
they have to comply with certain data standards otherwise they could not 
exchange information.177  
109. Mr Rejman-Greene confirmed that, “in terms of government systems, the first 
direction is almost always to try to look at open standards” but noted that there were 
“limitations” regarding what the Government could do “in terms of trying to impose 
standards on the commercial sector”.178 The Information Commissioner’s Office also 
questioned whether system interoperability should always be encouraged, noting that, in 
some systems, a lack of interoperability acted as “an important privacy protecting 
mechanism” through ensuring that an individual’s biometric was “effectively meaningless 
outside the system for which [it was] collected”.179 A similar point was made by the Irish 
Council for Bioethics in its 2009 report on biometrics. It stated that enabling greater 
information sharing through enhancing interoperability between biometric systems could 
accentuate privacy concerns on the grounds that:  
the more agencies and organisations that have access to an individual’s 
biometric information, the greater the likelihood that this information will be 
used for another purpose beyond that for which it was originally collected.180  
110. Standards become increasingly useful when they are widely adopted—namely 
required by customers and used by vendors to build standards-compliant products. As 
a customer, the Government can demand that its biometric systems adhere to national 
and international standards. While we recognise the advantages of the Government 
using its procurement powers in this way, and of the benefits of interoperability 
between biometric systems, we are also aware that there will be instances when 
interoperability should be prevented in order to limit access to sensitive personal 
information. Once again, in the absence of a comprehensive biometrics strategy, it is 
not clear how the Government aims to strike this delicate balance. 
111. The Government should explain, in the interests of the responsible use of data, how it 
intends to manage both the risks and benefits that arise from promoting open standards 
and the interoperability of biometric systems. 
  
177  Q50 
178  Q179 
179  Information Commissioner’s Office (BIO0009) para 20 
180  Irish Council for Bioethics, Biometrics: Enhancing Security or Invading Privacy? (October 2009), p 75 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Scientific advice on biometrics 
1. The Foresight Programme’s 2013 report on Future Identities was a missed 
opportunity to examine biometrics and identify the main trends, and the associated 
challenges, that policy-makers in this field will face in the future. Indeed, it is 
astounding that biometrics was deemed ‘beyond the scope’ of an apparently forward-
looking piece of analysis when, three years earlier, the Government had been seeking 
to rely on biometrics as part of its identity card programme. We agree with the 
Biometrics Commissioner that this type of forward-looking analysis is desirable. 
(Paragraph 28) 
2. We recommend that Foresight builds on the evidence gathered during this inquiry 
and undertakes a short, “Policy Futures” study to examine systematically the 
emerging issues, risks and opportunities arising from developments in biometrics. 
This analysis should be frequently reviewed in order to keep pace with rapid 
advances in biometrics and should be applied by the Government to assist its 
preparations for, and to help it shape, how this field may unfold in the future. 
(Paragraph 29) 
3. Despite a previous assurance from the Government, given over 12 months ago, that 
the publication of the forensics and biometric policy group’s minutes was on the 
horizon, this has not occurred. As a result, the remit and status of the group, as well 
as what has been on its agenda, remain a mystery. This continuing lack of 
transparency in the delivery of scientific advice to Government on biometrics is 
unacceptable and goes against the Government’s own guidance, as set out in the 
2010 Principles of scientific advice to Government. (Paragraph 35) 
4. To improve its transparency, we recommend that the remit, membership and 
outputs of the forensics and biometric policy group should be placed in the public 
domain immediately. A commitment should also be made to the publication of the 
minutes of all future meetings, unless there are overriding reasons of national 
security for not doing so. (Paragraph 36) 
A strategy for biometrics 
5. The Government undertook to publish a joint forensics and biometrics strategy by 
the end of 2013. Over a year later, there is no strategy, no consensus on what it 
should include, and no expectation that it will be published in this Parliament. In its 
absence, there remains a worrying lack of clarity regarding if, and how, the 
Government intends to employ biometrics for the purposes of verification and 
identification and whether it has considered any associated ethical and legal 
implications. (Paragraph 41) 
6. The Government should be developing a strategy that exploits emerging biometrics 
while also addressing public concerns about the security of personal data and the 
potential for its use and misuse, with particular reference to biometric data held by 
the state. (Paragraph 42) 
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7. We expect a comprehensive, cross-departmental forensics and biometrics strategy to 
be published by the Government no later than December 2015. (Paragraph 43) 
Testing biometric systems 
8. When biometric systems are employed by the state in ways that impact upon 
citizens’ civil liberties, it is imperative that they are accurate and dependable. 
Rigorous testing and evaluation must therefore be undertaken prior to, and after, 
deployment, and details of performance levels published. It is highly regrettable that 
testing of the ‘facial matching technology’ employed by the police does not appear to 
have occurred prior to the searchable national database of custody photographs 
going live. While we recognise that testing biometric systems is both technically 
challenging and expensive, this does not mean it can be neglected. (Paragraph 54) 
9. When testing does occur, the continued use of a variety of testing protocols by 
suppliers makes it difficult to analyse and compare, with any degree of confidence, 
the performance of different systems. Following the abolition of the Biometrics 
Assurance Group, it is unclear who is responsible for interpreting the outcomes of 
biometric testing for the Government. (Paragraph 55) 
10. The Government should explain, in its response to this report, why the facial 
matching technology employed by the police was not rigorously tested prior to being 
put into operational use. We further recommend that the Government details what 
steps it is taking to encourage suppliers of biometric systems to comply with 
established UK testing standards. (Paragraph 56) 
Public attitudes  
11. We welcome the Government's commitment to the principle of proportionality 
when it is considering implementing a biometric application. However, we are not 
convinced that the Government has clear steps in place—such as conducting 
mandatory privacy impact assessments—to measure consistently whether or not a 
specific biometric application is proportionate. (Paragraph 61) 
12. We have seen in the past how public trust in emerging technologies may be severely 
damaged in the absence of full and frank debate. Despite growth in commercial and 
Government applications of biometrics, the Government appears to have made little 
effort to engage with the public regarding the increasing use of their biometric data, 
and what this means for them, since the scrapping of the Government’s ID card 
scheme in 2010. This is exactly the type of issue that the Government’s joint forensics 
and biometrics strategy should have addressed. (Paragraph 68) 
13. We recommend that the Government sets out, in its response to this report, how it 
plans to facilitate an open, public debate around the growth of biometric systems. 
(Paragraph 69) 
Data storage and system security 
14. High profile cyber-attacks and data loss incidents have undermined the public’s 
confidence in the ability of both Government and industry to store their data 
securely. Security considerations should never be an “afterthought” or an optional 
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extra. We welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the security of the Government’s 
biometric systems is “bolted on” at the beginning of the design process. However, 
such assurances alone will do little to diminish the public's concerns while data losses 
continue to occur. (Paragraph 75) 
15. We recommend that, in its response to this report, the Government outlines the 
steps taken to mitigate the risk of loss, or unauthorised release, of the biometric data 
that it holds. (Paragraph 76) 
16. Current legislation places responsibility on the institution rolling out a (biometric) 
system to ensure that appropriate security measures are in place when storing 
personal data. However, we are concerned that there is no proactive, independent 
oversight of whether this is occurring. Conducting a privacy impact assessment at 
the outset of all projects and policies that collect, retain or process personal data 
would help to ensure that those implementing a biometric system are fully aware of, 
and compliant with, the necessary security measures. (Paragraph 77) 
17. We therefore reiterate the recommendation made in our report, the Responsible Use 
of Data, that privacy impact assessments should be conducted at the outset of all 
projects and policies that collect, retain or process personal data, including biometric 
data. (Paragraph 78) 
18. In our opinion, under no circumstances should the state roll out a biometric system 
that does not provide any scope for human intervention. (Paragraph 84) 
19. In the interests of greater transparency of data collection and use, we reiterate our 
earlier recommendation; namely that the Government drives the development of a 
set of information standards that companies can sign up to, under which they 
commit to explain to individuals their plans for the use of personal data (including 
biometric data), in clear, concise and simple terms. (Paragraph 85) 
Legislation and standards 
20. We agree with the Government and the Information Commissioner’s Office that, as 
a principle-based framework, the Data Protection Act 1998 should provide adequate 
regulation in the face of developments in biometric technologies. However, we are 
mindful of the concerns raised by experts in the field, such as Professor Sue Black, 
and therefore recommend that the Government keeps this matter under review. 
(Paragraph 93) 
21. To avoid a biometric application once again being put into operational use in the 
absence of a robust governance regime, we recommend that:  
• the forensics and biometric policy group is reconstituted with a clearer 
mandate to analyse how developments in biometrics may compromise the 
effectiveness of current policy and legislation;  
• as recommended in paragraphs 35 and 36, the reconstituted group should 
operate in a transparent manner, be open to receiving inputs from external 
bodies and publish its outputs;  
 
40    Current and future uses of biometric data and technologies 
 
• the Government, police and the Biometrics Commissioner should use these 
outputs to identify gaps in the legislation to be addressed ahead of any new 
biometric application going live. (Paragraph 101) 
The role of the Biometrics Commissioner 
22. We agree with the Biometrics Commissioner that there is value in the provision of 
day-to-day, independent oversight of police use of biometrics and that such 
oversight should extend beyond fingerprints and DNA. We also agree that 
broadening the Commissioner’s responsibilities would be a “more sensible” 
approach than establishing a new, separate commissioner covering other biometric 
traits. (Paragraph 104) 
23. We therefore recommend that the statutory responsibilities of the Biometrics 
Commissioner be extended to cover, at a minimum, the police use and retention of 
facial images. The implications of widening the Commissioner’s role beyond facial 
images should also be fully explored, costed and the findings published. We further 
recommend that the Government clarifies where the operational boundaries lie 
between the Biometrics Commissioner and the Forensic Science Regulator. 
(Paragraph 105) 
Quality standards 
24. Standards become increasingly useful when they are widely adopted—namely 
required by customers and used by vendors to build standards-compliant products. 
As a customer, the Government can demand that its biometric systems adhere to 
national and international standards. While we recognise the advantages of the 
Government using its procurement powers in this way, and of the benefits of 
interoperability between biometric systems, we are also aware that there will be 
instances when interoperability should be prevented in order to limit access to 
sensitive personal information. Once again, in the absence of a comprehensive 
biometrics strategy, it is not clear how the Government aims to strike this delicate 
balance. (Paragraph 110) 
25. The Government should explain, in the interests of the responsible use of data, how 
it intends to manage both the risks and benefits that arise from promoting open 
standards and the interoperability of biometric systems. (Paragraph 111) 
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